Voices in History by Leudar, Ivan
Summary
Experiences of “hearing voices” nowadays usually
count as verbal hallucinations and they indicate se-
rious mental illness. Some are first rank symptoms of
schizophrenia, and the mass media, at least in
Britain, tend to present them as antecedents of im-
pulsive violence. They are, however, also found in
other psychiatric conditions and epidemiological sur-
veys reveal that even individuals with no need of psy-
chiatric help can hear voices, sometimes following
bereavement or abuse, but sometimes for no dis-
cernible reason. So do these experiences necessarily
mean insanity and violence, and must they be
thought of as pathogenic hallucinations; or are there
other ways to understand them and live with them,
and with what consequences?
One way to make our thinking more flexible is to
turn to history. We find that hearing voices was al-
ways an enigmatic experience, and the people who
had it were rare. The gallery of voice hearers is,
though, distinguished and it includes Galilei, Bunyan
and St Teresa. Socrates heard a daemon who guided
his actions, but in his time this did not signify mad-
ness, nor was it described as a hallucination. Yet in
19th century French psychological medicine the dae-
mon became a hallucination and Socrates was retro-
spectively diagnosed as mentally ill. This paper ex-
amines the controversies which surrounded the expe-
rience at different points in history as well as the
practice of retrospective psychiatry. The conclusion
reached on the basis of the historical materials is that
the experience and the ontological status it is as-
cribed are not trans-cultural or trans-historic but situ-
ated both in history and in the contemporary con-
flicts.
Introduction
If you enquire in Britain today what“hearing voices” means, you will proba-bly be told these experiences are halluci-
nations, which indicate madness. Your infor-
mants might quote from national newspa-
pers, which tend to associate hearing voices
with an out of control violence (Leudar and
Thomas, 2000, Ch. 8). In psychiatry, verbal
hallucinations are regarded typically as
symptoms of serious mental illness. They are
reported in 60% to 75% of people with schi-
zophrenia (see Wing, Cooper and Sartorius,
1974; Slade and Bentall, 1988), but they also
occur in other psychiatric conditions, such as
severe depressive disorders, bipolar disor-
ders, dissociative disorders and post-be-
reavement states (e.g. Goodwin and Jami-
son, 1990; Ross, Norton and Wozney; 1989;
Rees, 1971; Grimby, 1993) and following
sexual abuse (Ensink, 1993; Greenfield et al,
1994). The usual explanation in cognitive
psychology is that verbal hallucinations re-
sult from reality testing errors – something
subjective is mistaken for something which
is objective and public – a vivid memory, for
example, may be taken for a perception.
Furthermore, in psychiatry verbal hallucina-
tions have been long considered to be an im-
portant source of delusions and in fact the
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words “hallucination” and “delusion” were
used interchangeably (e.g. Pinel, 1806)
This quick sketch might be taken to imply
that there is one accepted understanding of
these experiences. This is in fact not so, and,
as we shall see, never has been – different
versions of the experience were always
available, used to present it to others, and to
understand it. Several studies have demon-
strated that verbal hallucinations occur in the
non-psychiatric population (e.g. Sidgewick
et al, 1894; Tien, 1991; Barrett and Ethe-
ridge, 1992, 1993, 1994; Leudar et al, 1997)
and that the descriptions under which voices
are experienced are not necessarily those
which contemporary medical psychiatry pro-
vides (e.g. Romme et al, 1992). That is, not
every voice hearer takes voices to be intrinsi-
cally meaningless psychiatric symptoms, and
so the variety of these experiences should be
considered. It is in fact difficult to treat lan-
guage – and this is the essential aspect of
voices – as meaningless. Our investigative
approach is therefore resolutely pragmatic –
with an eye on the different practical conse-
quences of different versions of voices, and
on what happens when they encounter each
other in practice, as they always seem to.
In general, different versions of what
“hearing voices” is should not be thought of
in advance as merely alternative representa-
tions of the same, biologically given experi-
ence. One may distinguish concepts and
their objects but this does not mean that one
has to accept that the two are always mutual-
ly inert, or that the influence always flows
from the object to the concept. In his Re-
writing the Soul, Ian Hacking recently pro-
vided some nice instances of how new con-
cepts, such as “sexual abuse” and “multiple
personality”, resourced new ways of being
“mentally ill” (Hacking, 1995). He termed
this “looping effects” and subsequently lim-
ited the scope of the looping: the phenomena
of social sciences (their objects) are not ‘in-
different’ to the concepts, unlike those of the
natural sciences (Hacking, 1997).1 So are the
experiences we are considering here “indif-
ferent’” to whether they are “hallucinations”,
“visions” or whatever else? Are they biolog-
ical phenomena, which are indifferent to cul-
ture and the language used to speak of them?
These are empirical questions, but before
turning that way, let us forestall a possible
mutual misunderstanding by stating two
maxims we are guided by. One is that expe-
riences always happen under a description,
they are never, so to speak “raw”. The other
is that the influence of concepts on experi-
ences should not be formulated in a cogni-
tive manner (as happens for instance in lin-
guistic determinism and relativism), but as
mediated by the work of concepts in prac-
tices. If concepts operated solely as cognitive
mental representations, how could they ma-
terially affect their referents? Concepts are
social tools which resource practices in
which experiences are formed and situated,
including the experiences of mental distress.
The lesson is to remember Austin, and to pay
attention to the pragmatics of concepts not
just to their syntax and semantics.
It would be possible to demonstrate this
approach using contemporary materials and
we have done so elsewhere (e.g. Leudar,
Thomas, et al, 1997; Davies, Thomas and
Leudar, 1999). Here the focus will be on his-
tory. We will examine the practice of retro-
spective psychiatry, point out some of its
problems and provide a somewhat different
way to examine historical texts and consider
implications for psychology.
6
1 As we have argued elsewhere, Hacking in effect redi-
scovered a traditional distinction between the natural
and the social sciences, and a traditional explanation for
the ‘undeveloped’ state of the latter: that the phenomena
of natural science remain invariant across changing theo-
ries, whilst those of the social sciences may respond to,
and be changed by, the succeeding theories – see Leudar
and Sharrock (1999).
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Retrospective psychiatry
Retrospective psychiatry consists inreading old or very old texts in thelight of contemporary concepts. It in-
volves re-writing the past in the light of
changing knowledge, and substituting new
understandings of experiences and behav-
iours for the old ones. This makes sense if
you hold that psychiatry is a natural science,
and your aim is to formulate laws, principles
and categories which are valid universally,
not just locally. After all, Galileo discovered
the moons of Jupiter for all times, not just for
the Italy of the renaissance. And John Dalton
did not propose atomic theory just for Man-
chester and just for the 18th century. So “na-
tural” psychiatric categories such as schizo-
phrenia, and concepts such as hallucinations
should apply without a problem to other
places and times. But do they?
An admittedly somewhat unusual demon-
stration of the practice of retrospective psy-
chiatry and its problems is to try to read
Samuel Beckett’s Company as if it were a
psychological document.
It starts
“A voice comes to one in the dark. Imagine. To
one on his back in the dark. This he can tell by
the pressure on his hind parts and by how the
dark changes when he shuts his eyes and again
when he opens them again. Only a small part of
what is said can be verified. As for example when
he hears, You are on your back in the dark. Then
he must acknowledge the truth of what is said.
But by far the greater part of what is said cannot
be verified. As for example when he hears, You
first saw the light on such and such a day.”
(Samuel Beckett, Company, p.1)
The reader turns a professional and asks
himself, “Is Beckett talking about hallucina-
tions here?” and starts reading the text as a
professional, bearing the concept of verbal
hallucination in mind. He continues to read:
“Slowly he entered dark and silence and lay there
for so long that with what judgement remained
he judged them to be final. Till one day the voice.
One day! Till in the end the voice saying, You are
on your back in the dark. Those its first words.
Long pause for him to believe his ears and then
from another quarter the same. Next the vow not
to cease till hearing cease. You are on your back
in the dark and not till hearing cease will this
voice cease.” (Samuel Beckett, Company, p. 22-
23)
He finds that the voice speaks to the hearer
about his past, always in the second person
singular. It is repetitious, speaking “with
only minor variants the same bygones”.
These characteristics of the voice are much
like those many voice hearers report to psy-
chiatrists or to researchers when describing
their voices. Other characteristics do not fit
easily, for instance:
“The voice comes to him now from one quarter
and now from another. Now faint from afar and
now a murmur in his ear. In the course of a sing-
le sentence it may change place and tone. Thus
for example clear from above his upturned face,
You first saw the light at Easter and now. Then a
murmur in his ear, You are on your back in the
dark. Or of course vice versa.” (Samuel Beckett,
Company, p. 19)
The question is, is the voice Beckett is refer-
ring to a verbal hallucination? If so, was he
himself a voice hearer (the book is intro-
duced as an autobiographic piece), and could
one go even further and provide Beckett with
a retrospective psychiatric diagnosis? – as
we have already seen those going through
major depressive episodes may indeed hear
voices.
But if you read the book this way you will
miss the fact that Beckett used the voice as a
literary device. The memories of the charac-
ter are not his own, but narrated to him by the
voice. The device sets up the positioning of
the reader with respect to the Unnameable
and the narrator – the reader also becomes
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one who is on his back in the dark, hearing a
voice telling him of his past. What is not
likely to happen is for a psychiatrist to im-
port the way Beckett used the voice back into
psychiatry. But perhaps when patients talk
about voices, they do not simply lay bare
their hidden inner life, but use voices as dis-
cursive devices. Some individuals clearly
avow to hearing voices in order to disown re-
sponsibility for their actions.
Trying to read Samuel Beckett’s Company
retrospectively in a psychiatric way is clearly
bizarre, but doing so with the following text
may seems less so. This is from John Bu-
nyan’s spiritual autobiography Grace abound-
ing. (John Bunyan was an eminent English
religious reformer and writer of the 17th cen-
tury whose Pilgrim’s Progress was according
to Hippolyt Taine the second most read book
in English speaking countries).
“But the same day, as I was in the midst of a game
of Cat, and having struck it one blow from the
hole; just as I was about to strike it the second
time, a voice did suddenly dart from heaven into
my Soul, which said, Wilt though leave thy sins,
and go to Heaven? Or have thy sins, and go to
hell? At this I was put to an exceeding maze;
wherefore leaving my Cat upon the ground, I
looked up to heaven, and was as if I had with the
eyes of my understanding, seen the Lord Jesus
looking down upon me, as being very hotly dis-
pleased with me, and as if he did severely threat-
en me with some grievous punishment for these,
and other my ungodly practices.
I had no sooner thus conceived in my mind, but
suddenly this conclusion was fastened on my
spirit, (for the former hint did set my sins again
before my face) that I had been a great and
Grievous Sinner, and that it was now too late for
me to look after Heaven, for Christ would not for-
give me, nor pardon my transgressions. Then I
felt to musing upon this also; and while I was
thinking on it, and fearing lest it should be so, I
felt my heart sink in despair, concluding it was
too late; and therefore I resolved in my mind I
would go on in sin. … I can but be damned; and
if it must be so, I had as good be damned for
many sins, as to be damned for few.” (John
Bunyan, Grace Abounding, 1666, pp. 18-19).
Grace abounding has indeed been read psy-
chologically, and by no lesser psychologists
than Hippolyt Taine (1877, Book II, ch. 5),
Josiah Royce (1894), William James (1902)
and Pierre Janet (1903). The diagnoses pro-
vided included “hallucinatory delirium”
(Taine), “psychopathy” (James) and “obses-
sion and delirium of scruples” (Janet). In
their readings, Bunyan’s visions became hal-
lucinations or pseudo-hallucinations, and his
temptations became “insistent” or “fixed
ideas”. William James may have rejected
“medical materialism” and its explanation of
religion in his Varieties of Religious Expe-
rience but he also commented
“bent as we are on studying religion’s existential
conditions, we cannot possibly ignore these
pathological aspects of the subject. We must de-
scribe and name them just as if they occurred in
non-religious men.” (William James, Varieties of
Religious Experience, p. 9)
Even though James held that it was misguid-
ed to explain religion in dogmatic terms by
reference to the mental health of its practi-
tioners he also wrote the following:
“Even more perhaps than other kinds of genius,
religious leaders have been subject to abnormal
psychical visitations. Invariably they have been
creatures of exalted emotional sensibility. Often
they have led a discordant inner life, and had me-
lancholy during a part of their career. They have
known no measure, been liable to obsessions and
fixed ideas; and frequently they have fallen into
trances, heard voices, seen visions, and presented
all sorts of peculiarities which are ordinarily
classed as pathological. Often, moreover, these
pathological features in their career have helped
to give them their religious authority and influ-
ence.” (James, 1902, p. 6)
John Bunyan, though, did not use the con-
cept of mental illness to understand his suf-
fering. Nor did he use the concept of halluci-
nation to understand his spiritual experi-
ences, even though he sometimes had prob-
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lems in distinguishing them from those more
mundane ones, as he indicates:
“Yet still at times, I was helped to believe that it
was true manifestations of Grace unto my soul,
though I had lost much of the life and savour of it.
Now about a week or fortnight after this, I was
much followed by this scripture, Simon, Simon,
behold, Satan hath desired to have you, Luk. 22.
31. And sometimes it would sound so loud with-
in me, yea, and as it were call so strongly after
me, that once above all the rest, I turned my head
over my shoulder, thinking verily that some man
had behind me called to me, being at a great dis-
tance.” (John Bunyan, Grace Abounding, 1666)
The description under which he has his ex-
perience (a “manifestations of Grace”) can-
not be substituted by another term (halluci-
nation) without losing the sense of it or of his
reactions to it. Examining the practice of
retrospective psychiatry foregrounds the
historical conflict between different versions
of the experience and it may help to clarify
the extent to which they are constituted by
the culture in which they are situated. In par-
ticular, we can ask which aspects of hearing
voices are invariant, and which are contin-
gent on culture and history. We will next
consider in detail the case of Socrates in
these terms; what follows is a brief précis of
the detailed analysis presented in the Voices
of Reason, Voices of Insanity (Leudar and
Thomas, 2000).
The case of Socrates
Socrates is not usually seen as a religious vi-
sionary and it does come as a surprise to
many who know him just by his popular
reputation that he let himself be guided by ‘a
daemon’ which told him what he should not
do. This has been well documented by
Xenophone, Plato and Socrates, and subse-
quently commented on by many, including
Montaigne, Voltaire, and Nietzsche (see
Nehamas, 1998). In the early 19th century,
the daemon became “a hallucination” and
Socrates was declared insane on its account.
The great Pinel thought that Socrates suf-
fered from catalepsy and Lelut (1836), who
dedicated a monograph to the daemon, ar-
gued that Socrates was a victim of hallucina-
tions. For Maury (1855) there was no differ-
ence between visionaries, ecstatics and mad-
men. The apparent rationality of visionaries’
hallucinations was beside the point – rational
hallucinations were still essentially halluci-
nations, just like those of the inmates of con-
temporary French asylums. The conclusion
was that the great projects of Socrates, Mo-
hamed and Joan of Arc were motivated by
hallucinations and monomania. Now this is
clearly an extreme position and even the
retrospective psychiatrist of Socrates, Lelut
had to concede that
“if Pythagoras, Numa, Mahomet etc. were not
rogues, but believed in the reality of their visions
and revelations, which seems beyond doubt, then
these were men of genius and enthusiasm, who
had partial, isolated hallucinations in a religious
and reforming mode which was fostered by the
spirit of their age.” (Lelut, 1836, p. 346, cited in
James, 1995, p. 91)
But “the spirit of their age” was found want-
ing:
“This spirit, incapable of understanding such a
form of madness, obliged the hallucinator and his
witnesses to believe in the reality of his false per-
ceptions of whatever kind.” (Lelut, 1836, trans-
lated by James, 1995, p. 91)
While Lelut had to admit that the visionaries
were not necessarily insane, he deemed the
whole age and the culture which spoke and
thought differently wanting. Retrospective
psychiatry in this mode assumes and demon-
strates “progress” (see Schmidt, 2000). This
is of course not the only way it uses old texts
– Bunyan’s spiritual autobiography, for in-
stance, was also used to study the relation-
ship between religion and psychopathology
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(James, 1902) and between genius and in-
sanity (Royce, 1894), see Leudar and Sha-
rock (2001).
You may think that “hallucination” is an
concept which has always been to hand, but
its psychiatric meaning (which has subse-
quently become the everyday meaning of the
word) was only formulated in the early nine-
teenth century in England by Sauvages,
Sagar, Darwin (see Esquirol, 1845) and in
France by Esquirol (1838). Hallucinations
then came to be seen as a crucial symptom
and source of insanity. There were, however,
problems with applying the concept and the
French Societé Médico-Psychologique even-
tually met twice to debate hallucinations (see
Brierre de Boismont, 1856). One aim was to
see whether one could distinguish normal
from pathologic hallucinations, as for in-
stance those in artists and in the insane. The
differences between the two were drawn in
terms of
– control over the experiences;
– the ability to distinguish “internal percep-
tions” from perceptions of public external
objects, and
– their consistency with reason.
The distinction between normal and abnor-
mal hallucinations in terms of the last consid-
eration was formulated by Brierre de Bois-
mont (1861a, b) who proposed that there
were two kinds of them: the physiological
ones (which were compatible with reason),
and the pathological ones (which were not):
“But even though their manifestations are the
same in the two cases, their character, their logic,
their course, their ending establish sharp differ-
ences between them.
Physiological hallucination is constantly in
touch with the dominant thought, the mother idea,
the ideal; it is an echo, an adjunct, a stimulant
which decides the success. Whatever its duration,
it has the same force at the start and at the end,
and it does not trouble the reason.
Pathological hallucination, on the other hand,
has its origins in diverse causes and mostly false
ones; it is almost always associated with delirious
conceptions. It invokes most erroneous and con-
tradictory motives. Almost always it is impregnat-
ed with childish terrors, or is based on ridiculous
exaggerations. It presents remarkable transforma-
tions. After time, it causes confusion of ideas and
enfeeblement of reason.
These two [kinds of] hallucination have their
starting point in mental representations, which
exist in all the men, but their different character
depends on whether the reason is intact or
troubled.” (Brierre de Boismont, 1861b, p. 537-
538, our translation)
So, according to Brierre de Boismont, hallu-
cinations were not in themselves signs of
madness, anymore than say are thinking and
remembering, even though some people can
have bizarre and false memories and some
people think delusional thoughts. The mad-
ness of some hallucinations was in their in-
voluntariness, delirious content and falsity,
in the childish terror of the hallucinator, in
other words nothing specific to hallucinat-
ing. Brierre de Boismont implied that what is
called hallucinating is an ordinary mental
function, which can indicate impairment of
reason like any other.
But did Socrates really experience verbal
hallucinations? Plato, Xenophon and Plu-
tarch refer to his experience (after transla-
tion, that is) as “a voice”, “a divine sign” “a
daemon”, “a divine presentiment”, “a super-
natural experience” but never as a “halluci-
nation”. That term, taking the translators’
word for it, is simply absent in their narra-
tives. What grounds could we have for say-
ing that the daemon of Socrates was a hallu-
cination? Does it have the correct properties
to count as one? Today, as in 19th century
France, hallucination is “any percept-like ex-
perience which (a) occurs in the absence of
an appropriate stimulus, (b) has a full force
or impact of the corresponding actual (real)
perception and (c) is not amenable to direct
10
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or voluntary control by the experiencer”
(Slade and Bentall, 1988, p. 23). So if the
daemon were a hallucination, it should have
been an auditory experience with discernible
words. It should have been a private experi-
ence and in absence of appropriate stimulus.
Moreover if the daemon were a pathological
hallucination it should have been involuntary
and contrary to reason.
There is ample evidence that Socrates in-
deed experienced his daemon in the auditory
modality. Xenophon’s Socrates described it
as “a divine voice” which “comes to me and
communicates what I must do” (Xenophon,
SD: 4-12). Plato’s Socrates said that he was
“subject to a divine or supernatural experi-
ence ... It began in my early childhood – a
sort of voice which comes to me” (Plato,
Apology, 31cd, our emphasis) and “I seemed
to hear a voice forbidding me to leave the
spot” (Plato, Phaedrus, 242bc, our empha-
sis). Plutarch had Simmias report in the
“daemon of Socrates” that he
“had often heard Socrates express the view that
men who laid claim to visual communication
with Heaven were impostors, while to such as af-
firmed that they heard a voice he paid close at-
tention and earnestly inquired after the particu-
lars.” (Plutarch, OSS, 588c, our emphasis).
So Socrates’ daemon satisfies the first condi-
tion of being an auditory hallucination – it is
like hearing somebody. Now, was the experi-
ence of the daemon private to Socrates, pri-
vate like the present day hallucinations of
madness are? Or alternatively could Socrates
ever hear his daemon together with someone
else? None of our sources ever mentions an
event such as this. Socrates’ actual contact
with his daemon is always presented as his
own.
“Socrates ... happened to be making the ascent to-
ward the Symbolon and the house of Andocides,
putting some question to Euthyphron the while
and sounding him out playfully. Suddenly he
stopped short and fell silent, lost a good time in
thought; at last he turned back, taking the way
through the street of cabinet makers, and called
out to the friends who had already gone onward to
return, saying that his sign has come to him.”
(Plutarch, OSS: 580d-e)
The experience of the daemon involves a
withdrawal from social activity, and into
Socrates’ thoughts. But note that even
though it is private in this sense, the experi-
ence is still socially situated. Socrates is “lost
in thought” with his companions, and he re-
ports the experience to them. The daemon is
then a private and yet a social experience. It
clearly satisfies the second criterion for be-
ing a hallucination: it is a private experience
in that it is not co-experienced by Socrates
and others Athenians.
Let us next consider whether Socrates had
control over the experience and whether he
prepared the hallucination in the way a vivid
artistic image might follow a period of in-
tense incubation. The answer to both ques-
tions is “no” – the demon “came to him” and
provided him with wisdom which he himself
did not possess. But did Socrates confuse his
daemon with ordinary auditory perception?
Unlike John Bunyan, he did not.
Thus far then the daemon fits the concept
hallucination reasonably well, even though it
would be more difficult to say whether it is a
pathological or normal hallucination. There
is a problem though: does the divine, from
which Socrates and his contemporaries
thought the voice came, count as an “appro-
priate stimulus”? Not if you do not believe in
daemons. Lelut did not – an appropriate
stimulus for hearing someone in France in
1850s, as it is today, was a person speaking
in the vicinity. So we can say that Socrates’s
daemon was a hallucination. The problem,
though, is that Socrates himself could not.
Now why is this? He would have to cease to
believe in daemons, their wisdom, and their
causal powers. Socrates simply could not do
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this and remain who he was – his whole life
consisted in seeking wisdom in people, not
finding it and concluding that wisdom be-
longs to gods only. Furthermore, his under-
standing of the voice as a daemon had many
practical consequences. Most people would
probably say that hallucinating is an afflic-
tion. Plutarch (and the characters in his
book), however, concluded that hearing a
daemon was a privilege. Why is Socrates
granted the privilege? Plutarch wrote:
“but whereas some men actually have this sort of
apprehension in dreams, hearing better asleep,
when the body is quiet and undisturbed, while
when they are awake their soul can hear higher
powers but faintly, and moreover, as they are
overwhelmed by the tumult of their passions and
the distractions of their wants, they cannot listen
or attend to the message. … Socrates, on the
other hand, had an understanding which, being
pure and free from passion, and commingling
with the body but little, for necessary ends, was
so sensitive and delicate as to respond at once to
what reached him.” (Plutarch, OSS: 588d-e).
So hearing a daemon in Athens indicated that
one was gifted rather than insane and the
giftedness Plutarch talks about involves be-
ing able to resist one’s passions. Some men
are “overwhelmed by the tumult of their pas-
sions and the distractions of their wants” but
Socrates is not.
So French medicine looked at hallucina-
tions as signs of unreason, but according to
Athenians, Socrates heard the voice of the
divine because he was a man of reason; he
denied his body, sought wisdom and dis-
dained material possessions. This being so
he could do things with his experience which
contemporary voice hearers cannot. In other
words, we cannot project the concept of hal-




So far I may have been easily taken tobe saying that the history of hearingvoices moves through a series of con-
sensual descriptions. In Socrates’ time it was
a sign provided by the divine, but in the nine-
teenth century it became an auditory halluci-
nation and a symptom of insanity. This is,
however, not so. Even in Socrates times the
daemon was a point of controversy. First,
whilst his fellow Athenians had no problem
accepting that he could be in a privileged
contact with the divine, the problem was that
the daemon was not one of the locally recog-
nised deities. In fact, one of the charges at
Socrates’ trial was that he was introducing
new deities into Athens and thereby corrupt-
ing the youth (see Plato, 1993). By the time
of Plutarch (1st century AD) the social con-
troversy was different, as is obvious in the
apocryphal story and in the following quota-
tions.
“Socrates ... happened to be making the ascent to-
ward the Symbolon and the house of Andocides,
putting some question to Euthyphron the while
and sounding him out playfully. Suddenly he
stopped short and fell silent, lost a good time in
thought; at last he turned back, taking the way
through the street of cabinet makers, and called
out to the friends who had already gone onward to
return, saying that his sign has come to him. Most
turned back with him, I with the rest, clinging
close to Euthyphron; but certain young fellows
went straight ahead, imagining that they would
discredit Socrates’ sign, and drew along Charillus
the flute-player, who had also come to Athens
with me to visit Cebes. As they were walking
along the street of statuaries past the law-courts,
they were met by a drove of swine, covered with
mud and so numerous that they pressed against
one another; and there was nowhere to step aside,
the swine ran into some and knocked them down
and befouled the rest.” (Plutarch, On the Sign of
Socrates: 580d-f)
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“I have it from one of Megarian school, who has
it from Terpsion, that Socrates’ sign was a sneeze,
his own and others’: thus, when another sneezed
at his right, whether behind or in front, he pro-
ceeded to act, but if at his left, he desisted; while
of his own sneezes the one that occurred when he
was on the point of acting confirmed him in what
he had set out to do, whereas the one occurring af-
ter he had already begun checked and prevented
his movement.” (Plutarch, On the Sign of
Socrates: 581b)
The argument is now about whether the dae-
mon was a sign of wisdom and virtuous life
or humbug and superstition. For some young
Athenians the voices came to stand for su-
perstition and to be contrary to reason.
The general lesson here is that perhaps the
best method is not to seek the central ten-
dencies at different points in history, but
rather it is to examine what is controversial
about voices and how the arguments move
on. We shall do this for our second historical
case, that of “a retrospective hysteric”, St
Teresa of Avila. The following text is from
her autobiography.
“Like imperfect sleep which, instead of giving
more strength to the head, doth but leave it the
more exhausted, the result of mere operations of
the imagination is but to weaken the soul. Instead
of nourishment and energy she reaps only lassi-
tude and disgust: whereas a genuine heavenly vi-
sion yields to her a harvest of ineffable spiritual
riches, and an admirable renewal of bodily
strength. I alleged these reasons to those who so
often accused my visions of being the work of the
enemy of mankind and the sport of my imagina-
tion. ... As for myself, it was impossible to believe
that if the demon were its author, he could have
used, in order to lose me and lead me to hell, an
expedient so contrary to his own interests as that
of uprooting my vices, and filling me with mas-
culine courage and other virtues instead, for I saw
clearly that a single one of these visions was
enough to enrich me with all that wealth.” (Teresa
of Avila, Autobiography – cited by William
James, 1902, Varieties of Religious Experience, p.
21, my emphasis)
Note the categories she has available for her
“visions”. They can be
– mere operations of the imagination, or
– the work of the enemy of mankind, or fi-
nally
– genuine heavenly visions.
The text provides not only these categories
but it also indicates the procedures she uses
to allocate a particular experience to one of
them. One consideration is the nature of the
content and the consequences of these vi-
sions.2 Note, for instance, that the imagina-
tion enfeebles the soul, while heavenly vi-
sions afford spiritual riches and renew bodi-
ly strength. These procedures are though not
just St Teresa’s own personal ones – her au-
tobiography was assessed in her own time by
the church and even by the Inquisition. Ac-
cording to Father Bañes, a Dominican friar
delegated to censor the book by the In-
quisition:
“One thing only there is about the book that may
reasonably cause any hesitation till it shall be
very carefully examined: it contains many visi-
ons and revelations, the matters always to be
afraid of, especially in women, who are very
ready to believe of them that they come from
God and to look at them as proofs of sanctity,
though sanctity does not lie in them.” (Teresa of
Avila, Autobiography, 1911, p. xxvii)
Father Bañes decided that St Teresa was hon-
est in revealing her visions, unlike the de-
ceivers who may lay claims visions to appear
pious. This means that hearing voices is now
to be mistrusted. The argument is about
whether the mere presence of voices indicat-
ed piety and holiness. Bañes argued that this
is not so but the need to say this implies that
some thought so. Another authority, Father
13
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Juan d’Avila, provided support for this posi-
tion by arguing that visions are not necessar-
ily given just to those who are virtuous, but
rather those in need of spiritual love and
help. The main way, however, to assess vi-
sions (i.e. are they from the devil, from the
divine or mere psychology) though was in
terms of their effects and concordance with
the religious dogma. In the case of St Teresa,
according to the examiner they moved her to
love God and despise herself. “I see no rea-
son for condemning them, I incline rather to
regard them as good, provided you are care-
ful not to rely altogether on them, especially
if they are unusual, or bid you do something
out of the way, or are not very plain. In all
these and the like cases you must withhold
your belief in them, and at once seek for di-
rection.” If we compare this controversy with
that concerning the daemon of Socrates, in
both humbug may be involved, and the cate-
gorisation is achieved relative to religious
dogma. The crucial difference is that in
Socrates’ time hearing voices meant wis-
dom, in the time of St Teresa they may mean
exactly the opposite.
One important point is to be stressed
about the visions of St Teresa – it is the res-
onance between social and individual cate-
gories. The positions in the social dispute
about voices and the categories available to
individuals for the experience are broadly
the same.
So far the stress has been on categories for
the experiences of hearing voices and on the
procedures for assigning experiences into
them. The context is, however, important and
the extent to which they are idiosyncratic
rather than shared with others. The following
is an excerpt from the memoirs of the per-
haps most famous psychiatric patient in his-
tory, D.P. Schreber.
“I believe I may say that at that time and at that
time only, I saw God’s omnipotence in its com-
plete purity. During the night – and as far as I can
remember in one single night – the lower God
(Ariman) appeared. The radiant picture of his rays
became visible to my inner eye, while I was lying
in bed not sleeping but awake – that is to say he
was reflected on my inner nervous system.
Simultaneously I heard his voice; but it was not a
soft whisper – as the talk of the voices always was
before and after that time – it resounded in a
mighty bass as if directly in front of my bedroom
windows. The impression was so intense, so that
anybody not hardened to terrifying miraculous
impressions as I was, would have been shaken to
the core. Also what was spoken did not sound
friendly by any means: everything seemed calcu-
lated to instil fright and terror into me and the
word ‘wretch’ was frequently heard – an expres-
sion quite common in the basic language to de-
note a human being destined to be destroyed by
God and to feel God’s power and wrath. Yet
everything that was spoken was genuine, not
phrases learnt by rote as they later were, but the
immediate expression of true feeling.” (Daniel
Schreber, 1903, 124/136).
In formal terms, Schreber’s experiences are
not that different from those of Socrates or St
Teresa. He divides his experiences into those
which are ordinary personal ones or ordinary
public ones but also those which are super-
natural ones, to which only he has access.
Schreber had in effect two outsides, only one
of which he shared with other people. He
himself accepted that his supernatural expe-
riences had a different meaning for himself
and the psychiatrists. In this respect his ‘re-
ality testing’ capacities were intact. So what
makes him a madman rather than a visionary
like St Teresa and Socrates were? It is not
simply that he had visions and heard voices,
it was rather that the supernatural world he
spoke of was his alone, and unlike the spiri-
tual realm of religious visionaries it was nei-
ther shared nor culturally appropriate.
14
Outlines-2001-1.qxd  19-06-01  13:31  Side 14
Implications for contem-
porary research
The core ideas in the contemporarycognitive approach to verbal halluci-nations are as follows. Experiences
are assigned into two mutually exclusive cat-
egories, they are either subjective or public.
This assignment is a matter of meta-cogni-
tive inference (e.g. Bentall, 1990), of pre-
conscious inference (e.g. Hoffman, 1986) or
of an unconscious neurophysiological pro-
cess (e.g. Frith, 1992). The criticism which
follows from the historical analysis is that it
fails to establish participants’ own categories
and instead it procrastinates experiences into
the objective/subjective dualism. Not all
voice hearers or even researchers, however,
work with this dualism. William James, for
instance, argued in his Varieties of Religious
Experience that human experience is not
limited to what is provided by the five sens-
es – the spiritual world is as real as the ma-
terial one and experiences can be “public/ob-
jective”, “private/psychological” or “spiritu-
al”. Any reality testing procedure postulated
by a researcher, should take the participants’
own categorisation into account. The reason
is that, as we have seen, otherwise one may
conclude that a voice hearer fails at reality
testing, when in fact he or she is assigning
experiences consistently into her own cate-
gories.
One can draw on William James further to
formulate an even more basic criticism of
cognitive reality testing. The problem is
whether reality testing is necessarily a infer-
ential procedure. James (1902) did not just
argue for the “reality of the unseen”, he also
asserted that there is a sense for perceiving it;
the “spiritual” can be apprehended directly,
rather than just inferred.
“It is as if there were in the human consciousness
a sense of reality, a feeling of objective presence,
a perception of what we may call ‘something
there,’ more deep and more general than any of
the special and particular ‘senses’ by which the
current psychology supposes existent realities to
be originally revealed.” (James, 1902, p. 58; our
emphasis)
What, according to him, was this “sense of
reality”? He provided several examples, in-
cluding the following:
“I lay awake awhile thinking on the previous
night’s experience, when suddenly I felt some-
thing come into the room and stay close to my
bed. It remained only a minute or two. I did not
recognize it by any ordinary sense and yet there
was a horribly unpleasant ‘sensation’ connected
with it. It stirred something more at the roots of
my being than any ordinary perception. The feel-
ing had something of the quality of a very large
tearing vital pain spreading chiefly over the chest,
but within the organism – and yet the feeling was
not pain so much as abhorrence. At all events,
something was present with me, and I knew its
presence far more surely than I have ever known
the presence of any fleshly living creature.”
(James, 1902, p. 59-60, italics in the original)
The “sense” that James documents here is
described as follows. It does not come in
“any ordinary sense” (it has, for instance, no
visual, or auditory characteristics) yet the ex-
perience is spatially localised (“it” comes
into the room, stays close to the informant’s
bed and exits through the door). The “pres-
ence” is not seen or heard but “felt”, with the
feeling in this particular case being one of
“abhorrence”. There is also a distinct bodily
element to the experience (it is like “a tear-
ing vital pain spreading chiefly over the
chest”). These elements are common to all
the relevant examples which James provides.
In general, the direct “reality sense” is partly
a matter of intense embodied feelings.
Is this “sense of the unseen” relevant to
hallucinations or hearing voices? James
seems to propose it is:
15
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“we might suppose the senses to waken our atti-
tudes and conduct as they so habitually do, by
first exciting this sense of reality; but anything
else, any idea, for example, that might similarly
excite it, would have that same prerogative of ap-
pearing real which objects of sense normally pos-
sess. So far as religious conceptions were able to
touch this reality-feeling, they would be believed
in spite of criticism, even though they might be so
vague and remote as to be almost unimaginable.”
(James, 1902, p. 59-60, italics in the original)
It seems then that James therefore intended
the “sense of reality” to provide ordinary ex-
periences with a sense of reality as well as to
identify the spiritual ones. Moreover the
sense of reality can establish what otherwise
would have been a hallucination, into an ex-
perience of a spiritual event and it can do this
retrospectively. James quotes his colleague:
“It was about September, 1884, when I had the
first experience. On the previous night I had had,
after getting into bed at my rooms in College, a
vivid tactile hallucination of being grasped by the
arm, which made me get up and search the room
for an intruder; but the sense of presence proper-
ly so called came on the next night, after I had got
into bed and blown out the candle.” (James, 1902,
p. 59)
Something which starts as a hallucination is
retrospectively assigned a spiritual reality on
the grounds of the sense of reality. In repre-
sentational accounts of mind, a discrete ex-
perience is a hallucination if it occurs in the
absence of an appropriate discrete event in
the world. James’s account does not work
with discrete ideas but with the “stream of
consciousness”. An experience may not be
taken as a hallucination at the time but it may
turn out to be one in depending on the expe-
riences which follow.
There are two implications of these con-
siderations for our approach to hearing
voices. One is to pay attention to embodied
feelings, which may accompany voices, and
to establish how the voice hearer uses these
on a particular occasion to establish the on-
tological status of the experience. The other
is that reality testing may be extended in
time and not just carried out at the time of
experience. It may consist in a family of dif-
ferent cognitive procedures, some of which
involve direct perceptions, others meta-cog-
nitive inferences, some done in private, oth-
ers carried out with others.
In general, when studying experiences,
one should pay attention to their occasioned
and contentious character, and always ask
questions such as the following. What con-
troversies does the experience provoke in
particular social and historical contexts?
What are participants’ own categories for
their experiences, and what procedures guide
their application? How are the versions of
the experience made relevant in concrete cir-
cumstances, and what determines whether
one category is relevant rather than another?
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